Burning land

The fire business in Galicia.

1985-2026 © Delmi Alvarez

Spring 2026
Long-term documentary in progress

Prevarication, oligopoly, bribes, trials without culprits, rural depopulation, exhausted and poorly paid pilots, firefighters without contracts, outdated forestry plans, eucalyptus proliferation, pulp mills. Many people involved in the issue of wildfires remain silent and complicit. Millions of euros, families, jobs, futures, mortgages, and a long list of other things are at stake—things that shouldn't be spoken of and that they prefer to keep quiet. They must remain silent, keep quiet, while the fire business has claimed lives, and others gamble with their own.

The pilots of the Air Force's Canadair CL-215 seaplane ("43 Group") from the firefighting group based in Lavacolla started, one by one, the two Pratt & Whitney R-2800-83AM 18-cylinder radial piston engines, with a power of 2100 hp each, to load 5000 liters of water.

I fastened my seatbelt in the carrier behind the captain and adjusted my headphones, and they did the pre-flight check.
"Can you hear me?" the captain asked.

—Loud and clear, captain.

The sound of the two turboprops was music to our ears; all parameters, gauges, and navigation systems were working, as well as oil and fuel pressures.

The captain gave a thumbs-up to the ground attendant outside and requested permission from the tower to taxi and line up. Fires in the 70s and 80s weren't as aggressive as they are now, but to be an air raider (slang for Canadair crews), you need very thorough and extensive training.

Are there dangers? Many.

The story was worthy of publication in La Región, and the permission to carry a civilian in the cockpit was a gift any aviation enthusiast would envy. It's hot inside: pilot, co-pilot, and mechanic, all essential for the probes that allow water into the tanks. This is like a diesel train; you have to be highly attuned to any unusual noise. The Canadair isn't a Cessna or a small sightseeing plane; here, the powerful engines must be carefully controlled to prevent them from running wild. When its belly is loaded with 5,000 liters of water, controlling the aircraft requires the precision of a watchmaker: the aerodynamics change due to the weight and the support the fuselage provides while containing so much weight, and when the captain releases the 5,000 liters by pressing a button on the controls, the plane rises several meters, just like when a parachute opens. All of this requires keen eyesight, good vision, monitoring for power lines, avoiding dropping thousands of liters of water directly onto them (as that would be catastrophic), calculating crosswinds and prevailing winds, whether headwinds or tailwinds, and understanding the terrain. To extinguish a fire front or halt its advance, it's essential to have excellent control of the "seafoil," a Canadair in aviation jargon; these are many tons and demand extensive training and skill from the crew in the cockpit. From the ground, they receive support and information about wind conditions and any cables or other obstacles that might impede maneuvering. Water bombers become inoperable at dusk, as flying in the dark is impossible due to the limited visibility at a fire.

They typically operate from a base with a runway that doesn't meet air traffic regulations, such as runway lights, VOR, ILS, etc. Like other aircraft, seaplanes fly under VFR (visual flight rules) or IFR (instrument flight rules), but due to their low altitude and environmental conditions (smoke, terrain, power lines, and towers), they withdraw at dusk. For water landings, the crew, in coordination with ground support, uses reservoirs or rivers. Although their power allows them to take off in a short distance, it's crucial to ensure there is no traffic in the area, including recreational boats, divers, or people practicing sports.

The probes are opened by the mechanic, who opens and closes them once the filling cycle is complete. The captain presses the button to empty the enormous drums containing 5,000 liters. Colored liquids, fire retardants, are also used to prevent the fire from spreading. Unfortunately, there have been many accidents with fatalities among these heroes who risk their lives to prevent disasters.

The fires in Galicia have followed a trajectory consistent with the times in which they occurred. That is to say, this writer, after photographing forest fires since the 1980s, with 2006, 2007, and subsequent years, and 2013 and 2025 being the most severe, has no choice but to say that, according to statistics, 97% of the fires are anthropogenic, that is, caused by human activity. With climate change intensifying and the obvious interest in having fires, it was discovered that in Spain there was a group, known as the G6, that was perfectly organized to receive millions of euros from public funds: a sweet deal.

The Galician forest fires of 2006 were a set of 1970 forest fires (37 of them large) that ravaged Galicia (Spain), especially Pontevedra and La Coruña, from August 3 to August 15, 2006, which is when this long-term documentary project (Burning Land) was born.

The summer of 2006 marked the beginning of the fire business, the exposure of the G6 cartel, and the depopulation of rural areas, which, although denounced for years, became undeniable. The forestry plan was a disaster, with eucalyptus trees proliferating throughout the country, in greater numbers in coastal areas, where the wind and rainy winters nourish their roots so that, in 15 years, they can be cut down and generate income. They require no maintenance whatsoever and destroy everything around them; they are an abusive species that depletes the soil of water, killing other plants. And they are pyrophagous; they love fire. Their bark becomes a kind of torch that can fly, travel for kilometers, and ignite fire wherever they land.

That's what happened in the summer of 2017 in the province of Pontevedra: if there was anything like the apocalypse of those days, people lived on the edge. There were victims, women trapped in their cars, who burned alive due to coordination failures and a lack of knowledge about how to act in such cases in a Galicia of smallholdings, archaic and mired in the past. In the second half of August 2025, Galicia returned to that horrific past, with fires where 97% were caused by humans.

Hundreds of millions of euros went to the G6, who, under different company names, received money through emergency contracts. Despite an investigation by the National Court, no one went to jail, even though politicians had acted with blatant and complete impunity.

In 2025, the burned area, according to the EFE agency, was approximately 354,793 hectares incinerated by fire, which was one of the most devastating years in recent decades in terms of forest fires.
What is all this based on? If we analyze the available statistics and studies on fires, of which there are many, we discover that behind the fires is an undeclared criminal group, not organized from a criminal standpoint, that has operated legally for many years, with money, as I mentioned, of public origin. It is the fire business, “the self-styled 'Group 6' or fire cartel, a business network investigated by the Spanish National Court for the alleged rigging of public tenders, bribery, and anti-competitive practices in the forest fire suppression business for two decades.” The six main companies involved in this network, which controlled the oligopoly of aerial resources (airplanes and helicopters), are the following:

• Faasa (now restructured and part of the Safa operating group)

• Avialsa

• Inaer (operating under the name Babcock MCS España, and later acquired by Avincis)

• Martinez Ridao

• Safrose

• Helicsa (part of Faasa / Habock)

The conglomerate took advantage of the fragmentation of procurement processes, which depend on the various Spanish autonomous communities, to divide up the lots and emergency contracts, circumventing free competition. Alongside these schemes, and if we look at the legal and formal security and firefighting sector, the business network in this field in the country is grouped under official associations such as the Spanish Association of Fire Protection Companies (TECNIFUEGO) and the Spanish Association of Installation and Maintenance Companies (AERME). 

On what basis did this group operate and continue to operate?

It's pure logic. Climate change studies are unfortunately alarming. Summers with very hot spells, lasting between one and two weeks, create ideal conditions for wildfires. The land itself provides the fuel: due to the significant rural depopulation, the forests no longer have animals to naturally clear the scrub, gorse, and all the pyrophagous material that grows a couple of meters above the ground, as they did in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Poor forest management and the increased use of species like eucalyptus in forestry policy have created a veritable tinderbox, which over time has given rise to the so-called fire triangle: Galicia, Castile and León, and Portugal. These are the areas where thousands of hectares burn every year.

In criminology, this is called a "perverse incentive": if your business depends on wildfires, what incentive do you have to keep the forest clear or prevent them from burning?. Although the courts haven't been able to prove that the G6 companies ordered the fires to be started, there are several gray areas where their influence and business model do "contribute" to the problem's persistence:

1. The "Pay-for-Availability" vs. Firefighting Model

The big business for these companies isn't just flying, but being available. The government pays millions to keep helicopters and planes at the base, even if they don't take off. The conflict: If that money were invested in prevention (clearing the forest in winter), there would be fewer fires, and therefore, the government would need to hire fewer planes in summer. The relationship: The cartel companies lobbied for years to allocate the budget to firefighting (air) rather than prevention (ground). The dirtier the forest, the more necessary their emergency services become.

The Figures of the "Business"
The Fire Cartel operated for almost two decades (2001-2018), but the flow of money has not stopped since then.
Market Division: According to investigations by the CNMC (National Markets and Competition Commission) and the National Court, the G6 companies divided up contracts totaling more than €1 billion during their years of collusion.

Annual Contracts: The Ministry for Ecological Transition (MITECO) alone currently spends around €50-80 million a year just on hiring private aircraft for the summer campaign nationwide.

The Budget in Galicia: Historically, Galicia has been one of the largest clients. Between 2015 and 2018 alone, contracts for aerial resources worth around €427 million were awarded throughout Spain, a substantial portion of which went to the companies now known as part of the cartel.

Recent Approval (2024-2026): Funding for firefighting support exceeding €180 million was recently approved for the coming years.

Why do they seem to operate with impunity?

The Oligopoly: There are very few companies in Europe with the fleet of planes and helicopters necessary to fight fires. If the government bans them all at once, it will be left without aircraft for the summer. Therefore, even if they are condemned, they usually continue operating under new brands or temporary joint ventures (UTEs).

The Perverse Incentive: You are absolutely right in your analysis. If the government pays for "being there," and the budget for firefighting (putting out fires) is 10 times greater than that for prevention (cleaning up), the industry has no economic incentive to eliminate fires.

In the years following 1989, the victims of fire not only included animals, wildlife, and ecosystems but also human lives, as if nature itself, angered by the treatment it receives, demanded human sacrifices in return. According to the magazine nuve.es, the Spanish government and companies linked to the aerial firefighting sector in Spain have secured and managed contracts worth hundreds of millions of euros. Public spending is channeled through the central government and the budgets of the autonomous communities.

The big pie of the Central Government (MITECO)

The Ministry for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (MITECO) awarded nearly 270 million euros over a two-year period to private air transport companies.

• Of that sum, 156.4 million euros correspond to a multi-year macro-contract of three years.

• This budget covers the availability and flight of 43 private aircraft deployed in support of the autonomous communities.

• Meanwhile, the central government's regular expenditure on renting helicopters and private equipment is around 52 million euros annually.

Awards by specific companies

Despite investigations by the National Court and antitrust sanctions for the "cartel," these firms (many of them renamed) continue to dominate public tenders due to the lack of alternatives in the market:

• Avincis (formerly Inaer/Babcock): It consolidated its position as the undisputed giant of the sector. It secured a package of contracts from the Ministry for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (MITECO) and regional governments (such as Castilla-La Mancha) valued at nearly 60 million euros to operate 14 additional helicopters.

• Martínez Ridao: It remains active, securing key contracts in various autonomous communities. For example, the Castile and León regional government awarded it a multi-year contract worth 24 million euros. elperiodico.es

The conflict of rising prices

The private fire service sector in Spain operates under a regime of high corporate concentration. In fact, after deliberately failing to attract any bids in a major public tender, the aerial fire service oligopoly managed to force the public administration to accept a 43% price increase in contract fees (publico.es).

The National Court already issued a guilty verdict in February 2025. However, the reality of the prison sentences and why they continue to receive public money has very specific legal and market explanations:

1. Prison sentences: Why has no one gone to jail?

The National Court sentenced 12 people (businessmen and high-ranking public officials, including the former government delegate in the Valencian Community, Serafín Castellano) for crimes of price fixing in public tenders, bribery, and falsification.

Judicial Branch | CGPJ +2

• The penalties are low: The sentences imposed range from 6 months to 2 and a half years in prison.

• No prison sentence: In Spain, when a defendant has no prior criminal record and the sentence imposed is two years or less, judges usually suspend the execution of the prison sentence. Therefore, since the sentence did not exceed the threshold or because they negotiated reductions, none of the ringleaders actually went to prison.

2. Name changes and state contracts

It's exactly as you describe: the companies have undergone profound corporate restructuring processes, mergers, acquisitions by investment funds, or rebranding (for example, Inaer became Babcock and then Avincis). Despite this, they continue to operate and earn millions in public funds for two critical reasons:

• The "blackmail" of public necessity: The National Court imposed a special disqualification from contracting with the government for only nine months. The court itself admitted that they could not be completely blocked long-term due to "the impact that the prohibition could generate both on the workers and on the public service itself." If the State were to permanently prohibit these companies from bidding, Spain would literally be left without planes or helicopters to fight forest fires in the summer, as there are no other alternative companies on the market.

• The irreplaceable oligopoly: As owners of the vast majority of Spain's specialized aircraft fleet, the state and the autonomous communities are forced to continue bidding with them. In the vast majority of public tenders for aerial resources, only one company (the one that dominates that region) submits a bid, forcing the administration to award them the contract or leave the territory unprotected against fire. (Civio +1)

Legally, this situation is not absolute impunity because there has been a conviction with disqualification from public office and multimillion-dollar fines, but the practical outcome generates a profound sense of impunity. The correct legal term to define what the officials and politicians involved in this scheme did does include malfeasance, but the legal framework of the entire case encompasses a broader list of specific crimes.

The exact legal terms of the case

The National Court's ruling classified and punished these acts under the following criminal offenses:

• Administrative malfeasance: This occurs when a public official or authority issues an arbitrary ruling in an administrative matter, knowing it to be unjust. In this case, it was applied to the public officials who rigged the bidding documents for firefighting contracts to benefit the cartel.

• Price fixing in public tenders and auctions: This is the specific crime that punishes businessmen for agreeing (creating a cartel) to inflate the prices paid by the state, eliminate competition, and illegally divide the market.

• Bribery: The crime of bribery. He was convicted for the payment of gifts (such as hunting trips, cars, or travel) and illegal commissions from businessmen to the politicians involved in exchange for contracts.

• Falsification of commercial documents: Committed by companies when creating false invoices and contracts to camouflage bribe payments and justify cost overruns.

Why is it not legally "impunity"?

Even if those convicted do not go to prison, Spanish criminal law considers that they have already received their legal punishment through three means:

1. A suspended sentence is not a pardon; it is a legal benefit regulated in the Penal Code for any citizen without a criminal record who has received a sentence of less than two years. If they reoffend within the established timeframe, they will automatically be imprisoned.

2. Financial penalties: The companies and those involved have been ordered to pay millions in fines to return part of the defrauded money.

3. Disqualification: Convicted politicians and officials are legally barred from holding any public office.

The vacuum that companies are exploiting and the emergency contract

What happens with these companies is not a flaw in the penal code but a conflict of interest for the state. The principle of proportionality is applied judicially: the law allows for not closing or banning a company if the harm to the public interest (being left without firefighting aircraft and destroying thousands of jobs for innocent pilots and mechanics) is infinitely greater than the benefit of punishing the company's owners.

The company that continues to dominate the sector (with names). The company that absolutely leads the fire suppression market in Spain is Avincis (formerly known as Inaer, and later renamed Babcock MCS Spain).

• The undisputed giant: After being acquired by an investment fund that revamped its corporate image by changing its name to Avincis, the company continues to dominate the vast majority of state and regional contracts. It holds, for example, contracts from the Ministry for Ecological Transition (MITECO) and key regions like Castilla-La Mancha to deploy fleets of Bell 412 and Super Puma helicopters. Furthermore, it maintains strategic international alliances with manufacturers such as De Havilland Canada to manage the maintenance of Canadair amphibious aircraft in Europe.

• The other big survivor: The firm Martínez Ridao also maintains a huge market share in the field of ground cargo aircraft and continues to be a recurring recipient of multi-million euro contracts in communities such as Castilla y León and Andalusia.

The politicians implicated in the case

The most politically relevant name in this plot is Serafín Castellano, who was the government delegate in the Valencian Community and a figure of maximum importance in the Popular Party of that region (he became minister of governance and justice).

• The public officials involved: Along with him, the investigation and subsequent sentence implicated general directors, division heads, and technicians from autonomous communities (especially in the Valencian Community, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia) who provided internal information to companies so that they could adapt their offers.

• The mechanism of prevarication: These officials signed unnecessary emergency contracts or drafted technical specifications with such highly specific requirements that only the cartel's companies possessed the suitable helicopters, leaving out any other competitor.

Have they been to prison?

No. Despite the enormous public outcry and media coverage of the luxuries they received (hunting, weapons, cars, and trips paid for by businessmen), none of the politicians or high-ranking officials have gone to jail.

The sentences initially sought were very high (the prosecution was asking for up to 21 years for Castellano). However, after years of judicial delays and the application of mitigating circumstances due to undue delays, the final sentences were substantially reduced. Since the sentences fell below the two-year threshold, the judges suspended the prison terms in exchange for fines and a special disqualification from holding any public office.

The company that continues to dominate the sector (with names)

The company that absolutely leads the fire extinguishing market in Spain is Avincis (formerly known as Inaer, and later renamed Babcock MCS Spain).

• The undisputed giant: After being acquired by an investment fund that revamped its corporate image by changing its name to Avincis, the company continues to dominate the vast majority of state and regional contracts. It holds, for example, contracts from the Ministry for Ecological Transition (MITECO) and key regions like Castilla-La Mancha to deploy fleets of Bell 412 and Super Puma helicopters. Furthermore, it maintains strategic international alliances with manufacturers such as De Havilland Canada to manage the maintenance of Canadair amphibious aircraft in Europe.

• The other big survivor: The firm Martínez Ridao also maintains a huge market share in the field of ground cargo aircraft and continues to be a recurring recipient of multi-million euro contracts in communities such as Castilla y León and Andalusia.

The paradox of the sector remains: the state fines the brands for organizing themselves illegally but continues to pay them millions each fire season because there is no other private infrastructure in the country capable of replacing their fleets.

Emergency procedures ("by decree") eliminate the usual controls of public procurement to give absolute priority to the immediacy of the catastrophe.

It's not a legal loophole but a fully regulated mechanism (Article 120 of the Public Sector Contracts Law in Spain) designed to respond to disasters. However, the fire cartel turned this citizen protection tool into its largest source of illicit business in the following way:

The mechanism of the perfect business

1. The declaration of emergency: When there is a major fire or the summer season is imminent and ordinary tenders are blocked, the administration can contract goods and services directly, without advertising, without competition and without the need to process a prior formal file [1].

2. Deliberate obstruction: The cartel companies learned to boycott ordinary public tenders. They would leave bids unanswered in a coordinated manner or file appeals to delay the deadlines.

3. The temporary blackmail: When summer arrived without signed contracts due to their own obstructions, they put the administration in competition, between a rock and a hard place. The politician in charge was forced to activate "emergency procedures" to prevent the forests from burning without aerial support.

4. The arbitrary allocation: In that situation of extreme urgency, the government administration awarded the contracts directly to the only companies that had aircraft available in the area (those of the cartel), accepting the inflated prices that they themselves imposed.

The shield of the general interest

Legally, the "niche" that protects them is the state of necessity. Before a court, both politicians and businesspeople defend themselves by arguing that the absolute priority was to save lives, homes, and protected natural areas.

This noble goal legally justifies the state spending millions of euros urgently without regard for who receives them, allowing companies to use the safety of citizens as the perfect hostage to guarantee their profits year after year.

The judicial investigations into the "fire cartel" never found evidence that the companies started the fires. They didn't need to; the combination of rural abandonment, overgrown forests, and negligence naturally guaranteed their business every summer.

Judicial Branch | General Council of the Judiciary

1. The billing model: The "just in case" business

Extinguishing companies operate with a dual revenue system:

• Availability fee: They charge a fixed fee just for having their planes and pilots ready.

• Pay per flight hour: They receive a substantial bonus when the aircraft takes off to put out a fire.

• Guaranteed profit: Whether there are fires or not, the fixed rate guarantees annual profitability.

2. Who is really causing the fires in Spain?

Data from the Civil Guard (SEPRONA) and from Ministry for Ecological Transition (MITECO) They rule out the following companies:

www.miteco.gob.es

• Human origin: 96% of fires are caused by people.

• Intentional (55%-60%): Most are illegal agricultural or livestock burnings to regenerate pastures.

• Negligence (30%): Cigarette butts, sparks from machinery, barbecues, and faulty electrical wiring.

• Natural causes (4%): Mainly caused by lightning strikes.

• the discrepancy

The "fuel" you're referring to is real: rural exodus leaves fields ungrazed and unmanaged. The accumulated biomass turns the mountains into tinderboxes that ignite with any spark.

Greenpeace

3. The employment paradox: The firefighter loop

The economic logic you propose regarding job creation touches on a real structural problem:

• Extreme seasonality: Many forest firefighters are hired for only three or four months in the summer.

• Catastrophe prediction: The system assumes in advance that the territory will burn cyclically.

• Perverse incentive: Although firefighters risk their lives to put out fires, the labor model depends on the campaign being "high risk" to justify summer hiring.

To break this vicious cycle, experts from organizations like Greenpeace Spain They demand a radical change in strategy: investing money in forest management throughout the year (winter) instead of spending it urgently in summer when the forest is already burning.

Forest fires are currently burning in Spain. The season has started early due to a spring with high temperatures and water stress, with more than 1,300 fires and some 35,000 hectares burned so far this year.

The current situation is mainly concentrated in the south of the peninsula:

• Huelva (Andalusia): The device INFOCA. They are working to stabilize a fire in Almonte that has required the mobilization of some 400 personnel and 20 aircraft. Previously, they collaborated with Extremadura on another fire in the neighboring region of Monesterio (Badajoz).

• Granada (Andalusia): A large-scale operation involving land and air resources has been deployed to tackle a forest fire in the municipality of Játar.

• Early start to the campaign: In response to the alarming situation, the Spanish government has announced that the official wildfire season will begin early, on June 1st. President Pedro Sánchez presented an increase in resources, including the deployment of amphibious aircraft and new Chinook helicopters, emphasizing the need for a national pact to address the climate emergency.

17 units of the new Chinook CH-47F model.

Are private companies "jealous"? The sector's unease

Yes, very much so. Historically, employers' associations of private firefighting companies (such as those associated with the former cartel) have viewed the rise of military resources in the fight against fires with enormous suspicion and indignation for strictly economic reasons:

• Accusations of "unfair competition": The private sector has subtly criticized, through industry lobbies, the government's allocation of millions to train the Armed Forces (Army and Military Emergency Unit) for firefighting. They argue that this money should be put out to public tender so that private airlines can lease more aircraft and create civilian jobs.

• They complain about the "loss of pie": By incorporating the government, the colossal Chinooks and the Airbus military aircraft with firefighting kits The state reduces its absolute dependence on emergency contracts with private companies during the worst days of August. Every flight hour flown by a military Chinook is a heavy-duty flight hour that the state "subtracts" from the revenue of the oligopoly's companies.

• The clash of pilots: Private companies suffer constant losses of experienced pilots, many of whom leave burned out by the temporary nature of the civilian sector. Seeing that military pilots have year-round job security operating the best aircraft in the world creates obvious tension within the forestry aviation sector. (Infodefensa)

The government is using military force as a shield against pressure: by buying its own Chinook helicopters from Boeing and operating them with soldiers, it eliminates the fear of private companies challenging it amidst a wave of wildfires. (Infobae)

The Risk of "Administrative Sabotage"

There is a real fear that experts have pointed out:

If the maintenance contract is in the hands of a company that also offers rental helicopters, what incentive do they have to get the Chinook ready soon?

Any delay in the delivery of a part or an overhaul of the military Chinook forces the State to reactivate emergency contracts with private companies. Purchasing the Chinooks is a step forward, but if maintenance is not nationalized or handed over to companies completely independent of the cartel (such as Airbus itself or Indra directly under state control), economic dependence persists through the back door.

This is what some call the "spare parts tax." The G6 may not fly the aircraft, but it charges for every screw that is replaced.

Burning land: Arde Galiza

During the time of A Nosa Terra, in the 80s and 90s, Pucheiro (Afonso Eyré), the editor, once told me, "Photograph the after, not the before,” and I've held onto his words ever since. I've reflected on them so many times that I can't help but thank him for it. When summer arrives, the media has to fill pages somehow; it's July and August, months with hardly any political news to grace the front pages during the rest of the year.

Those two months are when the "interns" want to show off, as is logical, and fires and events are the mother dough of the daily, digital, on paper, television, or radio.

The wise words of Afonso Eyré resonate every time the summer season begins with the start of the "fires"; it is shameful to see how year after year the triangle formed between Galicia, León, and northern Portugal always burns.

In 2006, I began documenting wildfires again. In previous years, the situation had been relatively calm, but from that year until 2025, the fires became increasingly virulent, resulting in human deaths and the loss of ecosystems, animals, diverse fauna, insects, and flora. The blame was placed on the forestry plan that allowed the proliferation of eucalyptus trees. Logically so. These trees had grown, and around them was an immensely thicket of flammable material—the fuel the forest needed to ignite the tragedy. The exodus from the villages led to a lack of brush clearing, both by humans and by animals, which would have occurred naturally. There are no longer cows, goats, or wild horses to clear millions of hectares daily; the elderly who remain in the towns and villages no longer have the strength to do the work necessary to keep everything clean and tidy. The political ordinance choked on a single misstep, and environmental organizations cried out that Galicia was a powder keg due to its ridiculous forestry plan. But, if there are no eucalyptus trees, there are also no companies that manufacture pulp or paper, and the more informed society hasn't woken up from its lethargy for years, pointing out, with commas, the proliferation of fires due in the vast majority to the aforementioned.
Who's burning the mountain? We asked ourselves, and in the end, a small part of the story was revealed. The interests of farmers, a few pyromaniacs, jealousies, and grudges—but the media, except for A Nosa Terra and a few others, didn't investigate in depth who benefited from the mountain burning.

For many years, the G6 group operated in Spain, an oligopoly of aerial firefighting companies that obtained millions of euros in contracts to use planes and helicopters depending on the location of the fire. This criminal group was tried in 2025, but no one went to jail; there is no conclusive evidence that this company deliberately sets fires in the mountains or pays anyone to send its aerial firefighting resources. The newspaper Público.es He talked a lot about this issue in 2025, but hundreds of millions of euros continued to be handed out arbitrarily to mitigate the fires.
To this must be added the fact that scientists, professionals, the Civil Guard, the police, firefighters, and all those involved in firefighting investigations discovered that every summer, due to climate change, during the brief period when the 30-30-30 conditions are present, wildfires are devastating. By the end of 2025, 97% of these fires were of human origin—much faster and fewer in number but causing immense damage. In 2025, entire villages burned, along with almost no eucalyptus or scrubland, and the evidence found of the fires' origins was laughable: candles used at birthday parties, which never went out no matter how strong the wind; cats or rabbits carrying candles or other materials that started fires wherever they went; and, most outrageously, mountain paths where every 50 or 100 meters there was a small fire burning at night, precisely when the aerial firefighting resources, which withdraw at dusk, were taking advantage of the opportunity to start the blazes. We talked about the night, at night, during the night.

In 2026, a group of media outlets and journalists from that triangle submitted a project proposal to an organization in Brussels to investigate these events and requested funding—a very small amount. They submitted the proposal twice and were rejected both times. It was a very well-structured research project, containing information that had never been published in the media and testimonies from professionals fighting in the mountains, local residents, and law enforcement officers. Ultimately, they were told that, while it was an interesting topic, it was already well-covered.

Eucalyptus monoculture in Galicia has completely devastated the forest landscape, supported by a policy that encourages the planting of this pyrophytic species, which regenerates after a fire and alters the soil characteristics, reducing biodiversity. Among the most affected organisms are fungi, lichens, herbaceous plants, amphibians, birds, and aquatic invertebrates.

The 2006 Galician wildfires (93,000 hectares burned) were a series of 1,970 forest fires (37 of them large) that ravaged Galicia (Spain), primarily Pontevedra and A Coruña, from August 3 to August 15, 2006. The number of hectares burned varies depending on the source: 77,000 (Galician Regional Government), 86,033 (Ministry of the Environment), 86,232 (European Forest Information Centre), 88,000 (European Commission), 92,058 (Spanish National Research Council), 175,000 (People's Party). Four people died and one was seriously injured. Some studies analyzed the true magnitude of the 2006 wildfire crisis compared to what occurred in a "normal year." In several municipalities of the two Atlantic provinces, fires burned, during that 2006 season alone, an area larger than that of the previous five years combined.

Although the administration and many organizations do not confirm it because it is not in their interest, the fires in Galicia in 2006 and other subsequent years were organized and carried out by arsonists (52 were arrested), where the interests created a close, closed circle that cost the Galician economy at least 248 million euros (a figure that is equivalent to 0.62% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the community).

The recent legislation on forests was concerned with ending speculation so that burned land cannot be reclassified or built upon.

The eucalyptus arrived in Galicia in 1846, thanks to some seeds that Father Rosendo Salvado sent to relatives in Tui, who initially also considered it an ornamental tree.

The summer of 2006 in Galicia left an indelible mark on the lives of its people and the Galician mountains, leaving four dead and destroying more than 91,000 hectares. In 2024, after so many years, investigations concluded that it was a new type of fire, the work of organized networks, a form of arson terrorism. Environmental activists blamed the coalition government of the time for its lack of a serious, outdated forestry policy for Galicia, a policy that protected the planting of pyrophytic species for the pulp industry and the rezoning of burned land.

Behind every fire lies a process, whether human or natural. Politicians and the press have invoked "forest terrorism" and "organized arsonists." The chief prosecutor of Galicia, Ramón García Malvar, stated that "organized gangs of arsonists have turned Galicia into a vast inferno." " And, as has happened recently, incendiary devices and homemade fire retardants were found. None of the 55 arrests made that summer confirmed the theory of an organized criminal network.

In the early stages of the crisis, Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba and Attorney General Conde Pumpido also endorsed the theory of an “organized criminal network.” According to media reports, firefighters, forestry workers, companies contracted for firefighting efforts, and small construction firms are being investigated. Financial rewards and confidentiality agreements have even been offered.

Journalist Valentín Carrera wrote on his blog about the fire business: Every forest fire is a big business for someone whose face we will never see. A Matacán aircraft costs €5,653/hour, a water bomber €4,000/hour, a Kamov helicopter €6,000/hour, a Puma brigade €268/hour, etc. [Galician Regional Government price list 2012, where a couple of companies, Inaer and Natutecnia, dominate the business].

The cost of fighting fires: helicopters at €6,000 per hour and water bombers at over €4,000. Extinguishing wildfires generates millions in expenses that are only recouped if the perpetrator is found. Firefighters warn of a "fire business" due to the outsourcing of helicopter services.

The 30-30-30 rule for wildfires. To define the specific factors for the 30/30/30 rule to apply, the following conditions are required: Temperature above 30°C. Relative humidity below 30%. Wind speed above 30 km/h.

To claim that someone or some group is profiting from the fires in Galicia would be risky without first explaining our basis. Given the lack of rigorous investigative journalism in Galicia (the media are subservient to those in power and survive thanks to subsidies because advertising revenue has dried up), even in 2024, there are still no guilty parties, with the exception of the arrested arsonists; there are only conjectures, suspicions, and judges who would like to follow the trail. With verifiable reports in hand from the Civil Guard, direct witnesses, independent journalists, firefighters, and a forestry policy tailored to those in power, looking beyond what's already there is impossible; it would mean thousands of euros in lawsuits, lawyers, and cases that are dismissed and end up gathering dust in the basements of incompetent agencies.

In August 2006, a group of photographers traveled through towns and mountains; we swallowed all the smoke in the world and mountains; we saw what we saw and heard: threats, prohibitions, and honest and humble people trying to put out flames mixed with civil guards naked from the waist up fighting so that a family would not be left without a home.

We were in the province of Pontevedra; it was a hot summer night, and our contacts informed us that the mountain was being set on fire from several points. Arsonists know exactly where and when to do it; they wait for the ideal conditions to ignite the flames of disaster.

We went to the area—Gustavo drives very well—and saw how the fires on the mountainside merged to form a silhouette kilometers long. The scene was horrific, and we imagined the arsonist running down the mountain, everything planned to avoid detection. We never actually caught any of those madmen, but we did see some suspected arsonists joining the firefighting crews simply to watch the mountain burn. The Civil Guard and the firefighters suspected something was up, because these were the kinds of people who showed up at many fires and did nothing; they just watched, laughed, and disappeared.

One night, like so many others, fire surrounded us and other cars on a mountain road, and the only way out of that inferno was to drive fast to avoid shattering the windows and tires. Fire doesn't give warning; the wind rules, and you need to know about meteorology, with your earpiece in one ear and your phone fully charged. Colleagues triangulate areas, receiving firsthand information.

On another occasion, we encountered Portuguese firefighters, the Civil Guard, and civilians at a location where the fire appeared to be far away. They decided to carry out a controlled burn, a common practice used to stop a fire, but one that requires thorough training.

Several firefighters began using their drip torches to create a firebreak; the idea is that when the two flames meet, the fire will extinguish and not spread. But the wind picked up in seconds, creating enormous flames that nearly fried us. Even behind the vehicles, we weren't safe; the heat increased rapidly, and we had no way to escape. It's one of those moments when you think life is over; staying calm is crucial, as is trying to douse ourselves with water and avoiding looking at the fire. The feeling of being just meters away from a huge blaze radiating so much heat makes you feel insignificant in the face of Mother Nature. Hundreds of animals, insects, and other creatures have experienced this.

Dead animals; smoking eucalyptus trees; the silhouettes of trees burning with the voracious appetite of fire; incandescent ash flying for miles to fall on dry grass; men and women fleeing their homes, leaving everything behind and running. People died trapped in cars in 2017.

The neighbors blamed the photojournalists and reporters for encouraging psychopaths or organized crime by publishing the images because it pleased the arsonists who enjoyed it, like true modern-day Neros with harps, setting fire to the forests and watching their own neighbors' houses burn.

Galicia covers three million hectares, and half of it has trees.

Sixth generation fires:

Since 2017, a new type of fire, categorized as ‘sixth generation’ fires, has been identified. These fires are capable of altering the local weather conditions and overwhelming firefighting capacity. They are high-intensity due to a large accumulation of dry fuel, which, combined with the impact of the climate crisis, makes them ‘explosive’ and unpredictable, generating pyrocumulus clouds—clouds of gas and water vapor—that can lead to firestorms.

Another case of letting an entire village burn: A CARIDADE
AUGUST 2025.

Manolo, one of five brothers from a family in A Caridade, received a call mid-morning with the devastating news that his village was ablaze. Manolo was a thousand kilometers away from the village. He jumped in his BMW and drove at a speed of 180 km/h. Speed ​​cameras flashed like a coyote, darting past unseen. By the time he reached the edge of the security perimeter surrounding the village, the Civil Guard officers already knew who he was. From the moment he left until his arrival, they had seen that Manolo desperately wanted to see his mother and siblings, help them fight the fire, and save the animals, cars, and houses. “If I had been here, so many houses wouldn't have burned,” he said, clenching his fist in anger, revealing prominent veins on his forearm.

Smoke still lingers in some areas, tree trunks are burning, and charred, blackened beams are falling. The smell of burnt animals is noticeable from afar, even though they've already been removed and buried. The streets are littered with the skeletons of burned-out cars, and elderly people with canes point out to the stranger where they used to live. On a corner, a stone is stuck in the ground with an inscription and a small cross—a sad story common in Galician villages, a murder over a woman. But in this case, the man who died from a blow to the head with a hoe wasn't the culprit. The killer made a mistake and showed no remorse, even knowing he had killed an innocent person. It happened just around the corner from A Caridade. This time, death didn't use a scythe, and the stone, a reminder of that tragic event, marks one of the many stories of this small village in rural Galicia, which is becoming increasingly depopulated.

The depopulation of Galician villages is one of the reasons why the mountains are overgrown. Before, when there were young men and women in the villages, cows, goats, and even wild horses of endemic breeds naturally cleared the meadows and hills. But then came unemployment, poverty, and milk quotas, and the number of cows had to be reduced to a minimum. Stupid laws began to prohibit broadleaf trees, and eucalyptus was given more protection than cork oaks, chestnut trees, acacias, and all the native species that are not as prone to fire as eucalyptus.

The demographic abandonment of rural areas triggered a massive exodus, with people seeking the large cities with industries that needed strong and hardworking labor: Vigo, Barcelona, ​​Germany… leaving the villages deserted, the hills uncleared, the pastures uncultivated, and the forests increasingly filled with eucalyptus, all to escape poverty and misery. The heroes and heroines are the elderly who refused to move to the big city with their children, awaiting death peacefully where they lived their entire lives. The elderly cannot be expected to care for the forests, a sentiment echoed by some stubborn and ignorant politicians who have no idea how rural life works.

This is one of the fundamental reasons for the fires, but ultimately, we theorize that it is humankind (anthropogenic action) that is responsible for the forests burning: pyromaniacs and arsonists.

Manolo and his four brothers comfort their 70-year-old mother, who sits on a rock, listening to everyone. After giving birth to five children, she never imagined she would lose everything in a fire that could have been fought. An elderly man, pointing with his cane and his other hand in his trouser pocket, towards the mountain, says, “The fire came from everywhere. We got out as best we could; there was no one to help us, and now we have neither cell service nor water. We've been forgotten.”

References

The Fire Triangle. El Confidencial. https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2025-08-19/incendios-fuego-leon-ourense-zamora-agricultura-poblacion_4193030/

San Vicente, a village punished for years by the slate industry.

https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/galicia/2018-03-17/san-vivente-galicia-pueblo-enjaulado-guardarrail_1536955/

21. Pyromaniacs and Arsonists. Difference between the two. The arsonist, the scapegoat who bears the blame for the fires.

A scapegoat is someone who pays the price for something they didn't do. While it's true they aren't the only ones to blame, the arsonist is anything but innocent, and this is a huge aggravating factor.

https://elpais.com/clima-y-medio-ambiente/2025-08-17/el-incendiario-el-chivo-expiatorio-que-carga-con-las-culpas-de-los-incendios.html

The latest report from the State Attorney General's Office indicates that, on average over the last six years, 24% of all fires investigated for their potential criminal implications were deliberately set. However, it also shows that the majority of these, 68.79%, were due to negligence. The conservation organization WWF, which publishes an annual report on fires since [date missing], [states/reports/etc.].

Twenty years ago, the figure for intentional fires rose to 53%, because it includes illegal agricultural burning, explains Mónica Colmena, a technician with the NGO's Forest Program. The remaining fires are divided as follows: 23% due to negligence, 5% due to lightning, 2% due to fire reignition, and 12% due to unknown causes.

https://elpais.com/clima-y-medio-ambiente/2025-08-21/la-fiscalia-investiga-la-falta-de-planes-de-prevencion-en-la-peor-oleada-de-incendios-en-30-anos.html#?rel=mas

22. There is no livestock farming or game species to naturally clear the forest.

23. Prevention plans

“Nobody came, and they told us nobody was going to come.”

24. Analysis of why Galicia burns time and time again (September 2020): The deeply rooted culture of fire in rural areas.

https://www.wwf.es/?55382/Analizamos-por-que-Galicia-arde-una-y-otra-vez

Galicia and Portugal: Galicia is the autonomous community in Spain that burns the most each summer, has the most eucalyptus trees in its forests, and is the one that cuts back on firefighting services by reducing the budget for resources, forest firefighters, and forest management planning.

We can imagine the millions of square meters as a pyre of trees doused with gasoline. All that's missing is the match for everything to go up in flames. Without a forestry policy commensurate with its production and despite all the scientific studies carried out, Galicia emits enormous quantities of CO2 into the atmosphere year after year, which does nothing to help the fight against climate change.

In Portugal, the north is the region that burns the most. Years ago, there were many deaths, but little is said about the game animals burned alive in these tragedies. In 2025, Portugal began the season with fires in the northeast that came close to the border with the Peneda-Xurés National Park, which it shares with Galicia.

GALICIA

August 2025: So far this summer, more than 92,784 hectares have burned, overwhelming firefighting services.

The province of Ourense is being the most affected, with fires in areas where hundreds of people have had to be evacuated, the A52 highway and the railway line closed, and resulting in loss of life, dozens of injuries, destroyed ecosystems, and burned forests in natural parks. The Chandrexa de Queixa fire is already the largest in Galician history since records began, having burned 16,000 hectares, 5,000 more than the O Courel fire in 2022.

The question that is repeated time and again is: Who is burning Galicia and Portugal? Anthropogenic fires, that is, fires created by humans. Anthropogenic fires are those caused by human activity, whether intentional (criminal) or accidental (negligent), and represent the main cause of many fires, especially forest fires. Their origins lie in agricultural practices, carelessness by smokers, failures in electrical infrastructure, and the use of recreational fire, among others.

Types of Anthropogenic Fires

They can be classified according to intent and location:
Intentional:

These occur due to the deliberate intent to cause harm, such as in criminal acts, arson, or the burning of crop residue for agricultural purposes.

Accidental:
These result from carelessness, negligence, or technological failures.

● Forest: Agricultural burning, improperly extinguished campfires, carelessness by hikers, and power line failures that cause power lines to fall onto vegetation.

● Urban and Industrial: Failures in electrical systems, explosions due to gas leaks, or improper handling of chemical substances.

Common Causes

● Agricultural and livestock burning: Soil preparation for crops or pasture recovery.

● Negligence in recreational areas: Improperly extinguished campfires or cigarette butts.

● Criminal activities: Fires set for vandalism or to conceal crimes.

● Infrastructure failures: Deficiencies in power lines or transformer failures.

● General negligence: Any carelessness or lack of attention involving the use of fire.

Examples in different sectors

● Agricultural sector: The practice of burning crop residue to prepare the land.

● Urban areas: Explosions due to gas leaks or failures in the electrical installation of homes. ●

● Industry: Spills of flammable chemicals.

● Leisure: Campfires left unattended in campsites or improper handling of fireworks.

When the Nordés wind blows in summer

This project contains information and photographs of the following fires in Galicia during the years 2006, 2007, 2017, and 2025 (specifically, the worst in Galicia's history).

Preparing the research

To address the request for a comprehensive report on fires in the Iberian Peninsula in 2025, I have broken down the topic into several key areas of research. My plan is to explore statistics on hectares burned, the causes (including climatic and political factors), the role of firefighting services, government policies, and long-term solutions. This approach will allow me to build a comprehensive view of the problem, ensuring that it covers all the specific points of the request.

Action Plan

For the first phase of my research, I suggest initiating a series of parallel searches to gather essential information, focusing on obtaining official data from reliable sources regarding the affected hectares in Spain and Portugal, as well as seeking analyses of the causes. I will also investigate firefighting resources and prevention and reforestation policies. Finally, I will seek proposals from experts and organizations to find sustainable solutions.

References

Researching websites

Galicia has a total area of ​​approximately 29,575 square kilometers (km²), which is equivalent to about 2,957,500 hectares. However, a forest area of ​​approximately 1.5 million hectares is also mentioned, of which about 620,000 are broadleaf trees. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galicia

es-us.noticias.yahoo.com

Forest fires in Spain and Portugal force evacuations and the deployment of thousands of emergency personnel—Yahoo News

lamoncloa.gob.es

The Ministry of the Interior brings forward the start of the national summer campaign against forest fires to June 1st - La Moncloa

aman-alliance.org

Business News—Portugal: Government presents 2025-2050 Forest Intervention Plan—Lusa

noticias.juridicas.com

Royal Decree 716/2025: Strengthening of plans for the prevention, surveillance, and suppression of forest fires - Legal News

theportugalnews.com

The minimum distance of 5 meters for reforestation is repealed - The Portugal News

boe.es

BOE-A-2025-17312 Royal Decree 716/2025, of August 26, Royal Decree-Law 15/2022, of August 1, approving the common guidelines and criteria for annual plans for the prevention, monitoring, and suppression of forest fires, is published on the Spanish Official Gazette (BOE).

boe.es

BOE-A-2022-12926 adopting urgent measures regarding forest fires.

firepocteplus.eu

Experts from Spain and Portugal will analyze the necessary cross-border cooperation to fight forest fires in Madrid - FIREPOCTEP+

profuego.es

Profuego | 35 Years of Expertise in Fire Protection

es.greenpeace.org

Forest Fires | Greenpeace Spain

climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu

Adaptation of fire management plans—Climate-ADAPT—European Union

wwf.es

Forest fire prevention policies—WWF Spain

sciencemediacentre.es

Extreme heat and wind keep numerous fires burning on the Iberian Peninsula

miteco.gob.es

International presence in the area of ​​Forest Fires

defensa.gob.es

2025 - Military Emergency Unit - Spanish Ministry of Defense

cadenaser.com

Portugal manages to extinguish the largest fire in its history, which ravaged more than 64,000 hectares - Cadena SER

portugal.gov.pt

Exceptional measure recognizes the effort of firefighters in combating large fires

ume.defensa.gob.es

2025 - Military Emergency Unit - Spanish Ministry of Defense Spain

es.amnesty.org

Forest fires in Spain: Climate change is burning our human rights

new.theportugalnews.com

EU support for the fight against fires—The Portugal News

portugal.representation.ec.europa.eu

European Union strengthens support for Portugal in the fight against forest fires

comunidad.madrid

Forest fire in Tres Cantos (August 2025) - Community of Madrid |

miteco.gob.es

Strategic guidelines—Ministry for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge

miteco.gob.es

SPANISH FOREST STRATEGY HORIZON 2050 - Ministry for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge

ajg.com

Forest fire report 2025: Impacts of an expanding season | AJG Peru

aa.com.tr

Portugal and Spain face multiple wildfires fueled by high temperatures—Anadolu Agency

wwf.es

Forests: The worst wildfires in Spain—WWF Spain

es.wikipedia.org

Wildfires in Spain in 2025—Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

observatorioforestalgefrecon.itg.es

Causes of Wildfires—Gefrecon

panampost.com

Wildfires break records in Europe, with Spain and Portugal as the main victims

telesurtv.net

Wildfires break records in Europe; The Iberian Peninsula is the most affected—teleSUR

portugal.gov.pt

Statement from the Council of Ministers of August 7, 2025

portugal.gov.pt

Extended alert situation until August 13—XXV Constitutional Government

diaridetarragona.com

Spain, the EU country with the most hectares burned in 2025—Diari de Tarragona

infobae.com

Fire ravages 393,279 hectares in 2025, the worst figure since 1994: 90% burned in August—Infobae

edu.forestry.es

Major Forest Fires 2025 in Spain—Forestry Education

epdata.es

Forest fires, in data, statistics and figures—EpData

COPYRIGHT
This project is for educational purposes. Texts can be copied and used only to show students about the project as research to prevent wildfires and their aftermaths.
The best and right way is to contact the author, and he can provide additional information just in case.